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THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT TAX: EVALUATING STATE
REMITTANCE TAXES UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2012, the United States Supreme Court reminded a frustrated
public that "[i]mmigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation." 1
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court addressed the
growing frustration between controversial state laws enhancing law
enforcement's ability to deal with illegal immigrants, while in the
shadow of the federal government's failure to reform our broken and
paralyzed immigration system. "With power comes responsibility,
and the sound exercise of national power over immigration depends
on the Nation's meeting its responsibility to base its laws on a
political will informed by searching, thoughtful, rational civic
discourse." 2 While immigration reform efforts are anticipated in the
113th Congress, 3 the lasting impacts of the polarizing national debate
on immigration are best viewed from state capitols. 4
Frustrated by the failure of the federal government to modernize
immigration laws, state legislators are enacting or considering diverse
proposals dealing with undocumented immigrants. 5 Although much
attention has been focused on legislation empowering state
immigration enforcement efforts, state legislatures are also
considering measures that would enhance state revenues by taxing

I.

2.
3.

4.
5.

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,2510 (2012).
!d.
Jonathan Bernstein, What to Expect From the 113th Congress,
WASH.
POST, Jan.
3, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/b1ogs/plumline/wp/2013/0 l/03/what-to-expect-from-the-113th-congress/.
Motivated by a
changing electorate, Congress seemed willing to consider immigration reform in the
early half of the 113th Congress. See Seung Min Kim, Immigration Reform Bill 2013:
Senate
Passes
Legislations
68-32,
POLITICO,
June
27,
2013,
http://www. politico.com/story/20 13/06/immigration-bill-20 13-senate-passes93530.html. Perhaps the peak of this latest immigration reform pushed happened in
June 2013 with the passage of a bi-partisan Senate bill on comprehensive immigration
reform. !d. Prospects are grim that the House will debate, let alone pass,
comprehensive immigration reform in the second half of the 113th session. !d.
See Nat') Conf. of State Legis., NCSL Releases 2011 Report on State Immigration
Laws (Dec. 13, 2011).
See id.
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undocumented, or illegal, immigrants. 6 Such measures target wire
transfers, otherwise known as remittances, which are a primary way
for migrants to send money to their families or communities in their
home countries. 7 In 2009, Oklahoma became the first state to enact
this "remittance tax" into law. 8 This tax doubles the cost of wiring
money as it is nearly fifty percent of the transaction fee. 9 Nearly six
million households in the United States send remittances each year. 10
As such, proposals to tax remittances may be perceived as an
attractive revenue stream for many states. While many legislators are
looking to the success of the Oklahoma remittance tax as a potential
revenue-generator for their own states, 11 the tax proposals already
considered may embody potentially fatal flaws under the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution.
This comment will analyze the constitutionality of remittance taxes
under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause. Part II of this comment will provide a summary of remittance
tax efforts in state capitols. It will review the various types of
proposals and laws that have been considered or enacted, including
the motivations behind the proposals. Part III of this comment will
analyze the tax proposals through a Dormant Commerce Clause

6.
7.

8.
9.

10.

11.

See discussion infra Part II.
The World Bank estimated in that in 20 I 0, over 440 billion USD in remittances was
sent through regulated channels worldwide. Remittances sent from the United States
were estimated at 48 million USD. See THE WORLD BANK, MIGRATION AND
REMITTANCES F ACTBOOK 20 II 17, 19 (2d ed. 2011 ).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503.1j (West Supp. 2014).
The average wire transfer originating in the United States to a destination in Mexico is
approximately $370. See Raul Hemandez-Coss, THE U.S.-MEXICO REMITTANCE
CORRIDOR: LESSONS ON SHIFTING FROM INFORMAL TO FORMAL TRANSFER SYSTEMS 9
(2005). The estimated price for sending $370 from an Oklahoma zip code using
Western Union is $7. See W. UNION, www.westemunion.com (last visited Apr. 1,
2014).
ELIZABETH M. GRIECO ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO IN THE UNITED STATES
SENDS AND RECEIVES REMITTANCES? AN INITIAL ANALYSIS OF THE MONETARY
TRANSFER DATA FROM THE AUGUST 2008 CPS MIGRATION SUPPLEMENT 18 (Working
Paper
No.
87,
2010),
available
at
www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0087/twps0087.pdf.
Since Oklahoma enacted its remittance tax in 2009, several other
states
have
considered similar remittance tax measures. See A.B. 9462, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2012); S.B. 2423, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012);
H.B.
2677, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.B. 2365, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan.
2011); H.F. 343, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.B. 2255,2011 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2011); H. 4174, 2011-2012 Leg., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011); H.B. 1243, 20092010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010).
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perspective. Part IV of this comment will evaluate the tax proposals
under the Equal Protection Clause.
II. OVERVIEW OF REMITTANCE TAX PROPOSALS
Although Oklahoma was the first, and thus far the only, state to
enact a remittance tax into law, state legislatures have been
considering similar measures since at least 2005. 12 The primary
attraction to a remittance tax is the ease of which revenue can be
generated without having to burden voting constituents. 13 "This fee
does not cost the legal, law-abiding citizens of the state of Oklahoma
one red penny," said Rep. Randy Terrill, sponsor of the Oklahoma
remittance tax. 14
The Oklahoma remittance tax imposes a five dollar minimum fee
on a consumer making a wire transfer from a non-depository
financial institution. 15 For transactions of five-hundred dollars or
more, an additional one percent of the amount being sent is also
charged. 16 A consumer with tax liability to Oklahoma may claim a
credit on their income tax return for the fees paid. 17 Several states
have considered measures nearly identical to the Oklahoma tax
model including, Kansas, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Texas. 18
Other states have considered remittance tax legislation that would
apply the tax only to those consumers who are unable to prove their
lawful presence in the United States. 19 For example, a Georgia bill
that passed the state house in 2006 would have imposed a five
percent tax on the value of a wire transfer sent from a non-depository
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.

See A.B. 9462, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012); S.B. 2423,
107th
Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012); H.B. 2677, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011);
H.B. 2365,2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011); H.F. 343, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2011); S.B. 2255,2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); S.B. 92, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2009); H.B. 263, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); L.B. 1071, !OOth Leg., 2d
Sess. (Neb. 2008); H.B. 1238, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006); H.B. 2560,
2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
See Paul Monies, Oklahoma Transfer Fees Draw Criticism, NEWS OK, Jan. 17,
20 I 0, http://newsok.cornloklahoma-transfer-fees-draw-criticism/article/3432686.
!d.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503.1j (West Supp. 2014).
!d.
!d.
See S.B. 2423, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012); H.B. 2365, 2011 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011); S.B. 2255, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H.B. 263, 81st
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009).
See H.F. 343, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.B. 92, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2009); H.B. 263, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.B. 1238, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2005).
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institution if the customer failed to produce specific documentation
proving his lawful presence in the United States at the time of the
transaction.Z0 States such as California, Texas, Nebraska, and North
Carolina have attempted to pass like measures that would only apply
the tax against a remitter who could not prove his lawful presence in
the United States. 21
A key element of nearly every remittance tax proposal considered
has been the application of the tax only to customers of non-bank
depository institutions. 22 Nearly every remittance tax proposal has
included an explicit exemption for wire transfers made by banks or
credit unions. 23 Yet, banks and credit unions offer competitive
remittance, or wire transfer, services to the same targeted market as
non-bank money transmitters. 24
The remittance tax proposals advanced throughout the states vary
by the amount of the fee or tax to be collected. 25 Some states, such as
New York, have considered a fee as low as .5 percent of the
transaction value, 26 whereas Tennessee considered a proposal that
would impose a flat twenty-five dollar fee on all transfers. 27
Another key distinction between the models is the appropriation of
revenue generated by the tax. In Oklahoma, the Tax Commission
20.
21.

22.

23.
24.

25.

26.
27.

H.B. 1238, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006).
See H.F. 343, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011 ); S.B. 92,2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2009); H.B. 263, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.B. 2560, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2005).
See sources cited supra, note 12. Non-bank depository institutions, otherwise known
as money services businesses, are dominant players in the remittance sending
industry. Traditionally, companies like Western Union and MoneyGram have been the
primary companies through which remittances are sent from the United States.
Depository institutions such as banks and credit unions offer similar, competitive
remittance services. However, it has only been in the last few
years
that
these
financial institutions have been involved in the personal remittance market. See
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, REPORT ON REMITTANCE TRANSFERS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS 5-8 (2011).
See supra note 12.
Surveys of migrants in the United States indicate that a majority
of the
survey
participants reported prefer sending money through banks, credit unions, or nondepository money transfer companies, rather than through friends, couriers, or other
informal methods or channels. MANUEL OROZCO ET AL., IS THERE A MATCH AMONG
MIGRANTS, REMITTANCES, AND TECHNOLOGY? 18 (Sept. 30, 201 0) available at
www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/a%20match%20in%20migra
nts%20remittances%20and%20technology%20MO_FINAL _11.4.1 01.pdf.
Compare H.B. 2845, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012)
(proposing
a
twenty-five dollar fee on wire transfers), with A.B. 9462, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2012) (proposing a fee of .5 percent of the principal of the transaction).
A.B. 9462, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012).
H.B. 2845, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012).
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receives all of the revenues generated by the tax and distributes the
revenue into a law enforcement fund to help combat drug trafficking
and money laundering. 28
A Georgia proposal would have
appropriated the revenue for indigent healthcare services. 29 A
Mississippi bill would have created a fund to be to assist in building
the United States-Mexico border fence. 30 Regardless of the nuances
of the various measures, there are common elements of remittance
tax proposals that may be flawed under the Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution.
III. ANALYZING REMITTANCE TAXES UNDER THE
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A.

Overview of Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence

State regulation interfering with interstate commerce has been the
subject of judicial scrutiny since the earliest days of the Supreme
Court. 31 Recognizing the failure of the Articles of Confederation to
centralize the power to regulate interstate commerce32 , the founding
framers explicitly vested that power to Congress in the Constitution. 33
By negative implication, the Commerce Clause operates to prohibit
state regulatory activities, which unduly burden interstate
commerce. 34 The Commerce Clause restrictions apply not only
where specific federal regulation exits but also in the absence of
Congressional action where the affected activity involves national
interests requiring the free flow of interstate trade. 35
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is based on the
foundation of ensuring economic national unity. 36 As Justice
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503.lj (West Supp. 2014).
H.B. 1238, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006).
S.B. 2255, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011).
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-200, 204-05 (1824);
see
also
Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50
WM. & MARYL. REV. 417,428-35 (2008) (explaining the Court's early Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
See Hughes v. Oklahoma,441 U.S. 322,325 (1979); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (I 949).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
See United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338 (2007).

See id.
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1977); see
also Michael E. Smith, State Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce, 74 CAL. L. REv.
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Cardozo explained, the Constitution "was framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and
that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division." 37 The interest of national unity is often framed around
State
concerns of economic protectionism and isolationism. 38
regulations created to protect local economic interests at the expense
or burden of out-of-state interests constitute economic protectionism.
Although the Supreme Court has modified the judicial application
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, the contemporary approach to the
doctrine is well-articulated. 39 Facially discriminatory state laws
interfering with interstate commerce are virtually always per se
invalid. 40 Likewise, state regulations that do not discriminate facially
but favor local economic interests at the expense of out-of-state
interests are invalidated. 41 State regulations impacting local and
interstate commerce equally will be upheld if the state can show that
the law's local benefits outweigh the burdens placed on interstate
commerce. 42

B.

State Taxation Under Complete Auto

For over thirty years, state taxation challenges under the Dormant
Commerce Clause have been adjudicated using the landmark decision
in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady. 43 At issue in this case was a
Mississippi tax levied on the plaintiff, who was in the business of
transporting automobiles from Michigan to Mississippi and other
destinations. 44 In upholding the tax, the Court established a fourprong test to determine when a tax on an interstate transaction may
overcome judicial scrutiny. 45 The Court held that a state tax is
constitutional if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus

37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

1203, 1206-09 (1986) (explaining the Court's primary reasons for invalidating discriminatol)'
state laws).
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935).
See id. at 522, 524.
See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 6-15 to 20 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the modem Court's jurisprudence surrounding several
aspects of the Commerce Clause); Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate
Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX
LAW. 37, 38-50 (1987) (discussing the histol)' and evolution of the Commerce
Clause).
See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624(1978).
See id.
See id.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
!d. at 276.
!d. at 279.
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with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the State. " 46 Implicit in this test is the balancing of a
state's right to raise revenue and the national interest of the free flow
of commerce between the states. 47
C.

Evaluating Remittance Taxes Under Complete Auto

It is under Complete Auto that a remittance tax would be reviewed
for compliance with the Dormant Commerce Clause. Under the first
prong of the Complete Auto test, the activity taxed must have a
substantial nexus to the taxing state. 48 In other words, a state must
make a connection to a taxpayer's in-state activities to impose the
tax. Remittance tax proposals would tax the consumer at the pointof-sale, as each bill would charge the consumer the tax at the time the
transaction is sent. 49 Thus, the consumer would be charged a tax for
using the services of a business located within the state. This is likely
sufficient to establish that the state has a connection to the taxpayer's
activity.
The second prong of the Complete Auto test requires the tax to be
fairly apportioned. 50 This prong prevents multiple taxation by
ensuring "that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate
transaction."51 A tax is fairly apportioned if it is internally and
externally consistent. 52 "To be internally consistent, a tax must be
structured so that if every State were to impose an identical tax, no
multiple taxation would result." 53 External consistency ensures that a
state does not tax beyond that portion of value that is fairly
attributable to economic activity within the taxing state. 54 Proposals
to tax remittances are both internally and externally consistent in how
the tax is structured. Because the tax is collected at the time the
transaction is made, there is no risk of multiple taxation, even if each
state had an identical tax.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Jd.
See id.
Jd.
See supra note 11.
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,260--61 (1989).
I d. at 261.
Jd.
Jd. at 262.
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The fourth prong of the Complete Auto test requires that the tax be
"fairly related to the presence and activities of the taxpayer within the
State."55 This prong ensures that those who do not have an
opportunity to benefit from the services provided by a state are not
taxed for those services. 56 A taxpayer's access to the "advantages of
civilized society," such as services provided by the local government,
satisfy "the requirement that the tax be fairly related to benefits
provided by the State to the taxpayer." 57 A consumer seeking to
make a wire transfer within a taxing state is already enjoying the
privileges and protections of being able to purchase services and
products from businesses located in the state. Because the person is
seeking to make a wire transaction from a business within the taxing
state, the tax is related to the person's presence and activity within
the state.
Remittance taxes are likely to satisfy the substantial nexus, fair
apportionment, and the fairly related prongs of the Complete Auto
test. Where the tax would be challenged is under the third prong of
Complete Auto: whether the tax discriminates against out-of-state
interests. 58 A remittance tax is likely to fail this prong if it is
determined that it discriminates against out-of-state interests or it
embodies economic protectionism or isolationism.
1. Discrimination Against Out-of-State Interests
a. Examining the tax credit provision for discriminatory treatment of
in-state residents and out-ofstate residents

A key feature of remittance tax proposals considered thus far has
been the allowance for a remitter with tax liability to the state in
which the remittance tax is paid to receive a tax credit if they have
tax liability with the taxing state. 59 For example, the Oklahoma law
imposes a five dollar minimum tax on all senders of wire transfers;
however, a sender with Oklahoma tax liability can claim a credit for
the wire transfer fee on his income tax retum. 6° Consequently, outof-state residents are barred from receiving the tax credit, while instate residents, assuming they have tax liability to the state, are
eligible to receive the credit. 61 Thus, a resident of any other state or
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

/d. at 266.
/d. at 266-67.
!d. at 267.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503.lj (West Supp. 2014).
See id.
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country-who may be vacationing in Oklahoma, visiting family in
Oklahoma, or traveling within Oklahoma for business-sending a
money transfer from Oklahoma would be subjected to the fee, just as
a resident of Oklahoma. However, whereas the Oklahoma resident
may claim a tax credit for the applied fee, the law affords no similar
treatment for out-of-state senders.
Analogous to the remittance tax is the Court's treatment of
regulatory schemes that are crafted with exceptions or exemptions.
The Court has consistently invalidated state regulatory schemes that
have exceptions favoring in-state interests as facially discriminate
laws. 62 For example, in the case of Camps Newfound/Owatonna v.
Town of Harrison, the Court invalidated a Maine statute that denied a
charitable tax exemption to nonprofit organizations operating
principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of
Maine. 63 Furthermore, a court examining a state tax must look not
only at the tax, but also to any credits, exemptions or exclusions
associated with that tax. 64 In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Court
determined that a state usage tax on natural gas, known as the First
Use Tax, was unconstitutional because its elaborate mechanism of
credits and exemptions favored local business interests over out-ofstate interests. 65 The Court also noted that the credits and exemptions
allowed by the Louisiana statutes undeniably violated the principle of
equality. 66
It may be argued that the allowance of a tax credit is not
discriminatory against out-of-state interests because the taxing state
does not have the authority to provide a similar credit to those
taxpayers who do not have tax liability to the state. However, the tax
credit associated with the remittance tax would relieve the burden of
the tax from an in-state resident and shift it to an out-of-state
resident. 67 Although a tax may be enacted without the intention of
discriminating against out-of-state interests, if the tax on its face
does, in fact, facially discriminate, then it is invalid. 68 "Equal
treatment for in-state and out-of-state taxpayers similarly situated is
the condition precedent for a valid ... tax." 69
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,588 (1997).
See id. 570-71.
See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756 (1981).
!d.
See id. at 757-58.
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503.lj (West Supp. 2014).
See Maryland, 451 U.S. at 759.
/d. (citing Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64,70 (1963)).
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By affording consumers with Oklahoma tax liability a credit for the
amount of the tax paid, Oklahoma is imposing a penalty on out-ofstate residents. Although this tax may not pose an immediate threat to
national economic unity/ 0 the Court reminds us that history "has
shown that even the smallest discrimination invites significant
inroads on national solidarity."71
b. Examining the exemption of remittances taxes to banks and credit
unions for discriminatory treatment of in-state interests and outofstate interests

The Dormant Commerce Clause serves as a limitation against a
state's ability to tax interstate transactions as a means of favoring
local businesses over out-of-state businesses. 72 Thus, the Court has
held that state taxation schemes designed intentionally or
unintentionally to favor local business may violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 73 For example, the Court determined that a
Hawaii statute enacting a twenty percent excise tax on wholesale
liquor was invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause because the
tax impermissibly exempted certain locally made alcoholic
beverages. 74 Although the consumer had the duty to pay the tax, the
Court determined that the tax had the purpose and effect of
discriminating in favor of local interests, and therefore served as a
form of economic protectionism. 75 While conceding a state's police
power to promote local business, the Court reminded the State that
this power was limited by the Commerce Clause and that a state may
not, "discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business
operations performed in any other State."76
Likewise, the Court determined that a New York stock-transfer tax
that provided reduced rates for certain transfers of stock when the
sale was effected through New York brokers offended the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 77 The Court found that the law would be likely to
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

After the Oklahoma tax was enacted and other states attempted to follow suit, the
Mexican Congress called upon its government to implement a boycott against states that
impose remittance taxes. See Press Release, Members of Congress Mexico, Mexican
Congress Urges Mexican Government to Respond and Retaliate Against the Immoral,
Abusive and Harmful Remittance Fee Violating the Rights of Immigrants in Oklahoma
(Apr. 8, 2010).
Camps Newfound/Owatonna V. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997).
See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,329 (1977).
See id. at 331-32; Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 373 U.S. at 73-74.
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1984).
!d.
!d. at 272.
Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 321-23, 328.
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induce a seller to trade through a New York broker to reduce his
transfer tax liability. 78 By providing a tax incentive for sellers to deal
with New York rather than out-of-state brokers, the state had, in the
Court's eyes, "us[ed] its power to tax an in-state operation as a means
of requiring other business operations to be performed in the home
State."79
States that have considered remittance tax proposals consistently
apply the tax to non-bank money transmitters, but explicitly exempt
other financial institutions from the statute, 80 even though such
financial institutions offer competitive services to the non-bank
entities. 81 Thus, the application of the tax only to non-bank money
transmitters, even though other financial institutions offer
competitive and similar products, 82 may prove problematic under the
Dormant Commerce Clause because the tax could be interpreted as
providing a commercial advantage to local businesses or economic
interests.
When examining the implication of exempting banks and credit
unions from charging and collecting the remittance tax, it must first
be established that wire transfers performed by non-banks are
substantially similar to wire transfers performed at banks and credit
unions. 83
Any notion of discrimination under the Dormant
Commerce Clause assumes a comparison of substantially similar
entities. 84 The Court has provided guidance in determining whether
entities are similarly situated for this analysis:
[if] the difference in products may mean that the different
entities serve different markets, and would continue to do so
even if the supposedly discriminatory burden were removed
... eliminating the tax of other regulatory differential would
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.

!d. at 330-31.
!d. at 336 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See A.B. 9462,2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012); S.B. 2423,
107th
Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012); H.B. 2365, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011);
S.B. 2255, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011); H. 4174, 2011-2012 Leg., !19th Sess.
(S.C. 2011); H.B. 2677,2011 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011); H.F. 343, 87th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011); S.B. 92, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); H.B. 263,
8lst Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); L.B. 1071, 2008 Leg., 100th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb.
2008); H.B. 1238, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006); H.B. 2560, 2005-2006
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005).
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 22, at 8.
See id. at 7-8.
General Motor Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997).
!d.
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not serve the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental
objective of preserving a national market for competition
undisturbed by preferential advantages conferred by a State
upon its residents or resident competitors. 85
Determining whether entities are similarly situated is largely a factintensive inquiry. 86
Non-bank money transmitters have largely been dominant in the
remittance sending industry. Still, banks and credit unions do offer
competing remittance transfer products to those offered by non-bank
money transfers. 87 Remittance transfers are primarily cash-to-cash
transfers, 88 and typically do not require a consumer to have a bank
account. 89 And while non-bank money transmitters have historically
dominated this market, 90 banks and credit unions may offer
remittance services in partnership with non-bank money transmitters
or they may have their own product to facilitate a cash-to-cash
transfer without the need for an associated banking account. 91
In distinguishing between the remittance transfers provided by a
non-bank money transmitter and a bank, a state may argue that wire
transfers initiated at banks or credit unions are more likely to be for
business purposes as opposed to personal remittances. 92 Arguably,
this is a distinction between the entities that show that they are not
similarly situated. Another argument that could be made to
distinguish the products is how each institution is regulated. Banks
and credit unions are regulated under differing state codes than

85.
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
See id.
See Letter from Michigan Credit Union League to Jennifer Johnson, Secretary of the
Board ofGovemors of the Federal Reserve System (July 20, 2011), available at
http://www .. federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/July/20110728/R-1419/R-1419 _072011
_82956_334592222190_1.pdf; Letter from First Tennessee Bank National Association to
Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (July
20, 2011 ), available athttp://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/20 11/July/20 11 0728/R-14
19/R-1419_072011_82962_334726443517 _1.pdf.
See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 22, at 7-8.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See id. at 8.
See DILIP RA THA & JAN REIDBERG, ON REDUCING REMITTANCE COSTS
21-24
(WORLD
BANK
2005),
available
at
http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/0
nreducingremittancecosts-revisedMay12.pdf (explaining banks are regulated under
state banking codes and money transmitters are regulated under state money
transmitter codes).
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money transmitters. 93 This difference in regulatory structure could
weigh in favor of the entities being treated differently. It could also
be argued that banks and credit unions serve a different market for
wire transfers than do money transmitters. 94 For example, a bank
may argue that its wire transfer products cater to customers that hold
personal checking or savings accounts. 95 A money transmitter,
however, does not have an account-based relationship with its
consumers, and therefore relies on a different market base for its wire
transfer product. 96
On the other hand, banks and credit unions acknowledge and
market the competitiveness of their wire transfer products against
those services of non-bank money transmitters. 97 Many banks are
competing directly to attract the perceived financially underserved
market that has relied on money transmitters to send personal
remittances. 98
Lawmakers and consumer advocates have also
recognized that banks and credit unions are becoming an increasingly
competitive provider of sending cross-border remittances. 99 In fact,
policymakers and consumer advocates alike have pushed for banks
and credit unions to become more competitive with non-bank money
transmitters. 100 While non-bank money transmitters and banks and
credit unions are licensed under different state codes, 101 for purposes
of consumer protection, federal law recognizes a remittance transfer
provider as a "person or financial institution that provides remittance
transfers for a consumer in the normal course of its business, whether
or not the consumer holds an account with such person or financial

See id. at 23-24.
See id. at 21-22.
See id.
See id. at 12.
See, e.g., Wells Fargo Celebrates a Decade in Consumer Remittances
with
Fee
Waiver Offer: Send Money Internationally for Free, ALA. Bus. MONTHLY, Feb. 15,
2013, available at http://www.akbizmag.com/A1aska-Business-Month1y/February-201
3/W ells-Fargo-Celebrates-a-Decade-in-Consumer-Remittances-with-Fee-W aiver-Offe
r-Send-Money-Intemationally-for-Free/.
See id.
98.
99.
See Remittances: Regulation and Disclosure in a New Econ. Env 't: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Fin. lnst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
11lth Cong. 4, 25, 41, 70, 74 (2009).
100. See id. at 4, 25.
101. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Fin. Inst. §§ 3-101-6-909 (LexisNexis 2013) (governing
banks and credit unions); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law§§ 4A-101-4A-108 (LexisNexis
2013) (governing funds transfers).
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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institution." 102
Thus, federal law defines remittance transfer
providers to include non-bank financial institutions, banks, and credit
unions. This unifying definition could weigh in favor of arguing for
similar treatment between the different providers.
Regardless of the technical distinction between the entities that
must charge a remittance tax and those that are exempt from charging
it, the tax is likely to burden out-of-state business more so than instate businesses. Non-bank money transmitters, such as Western
Union or MoneyGram, are national, or multi-national, corporations
whose business operations are not centered in the taxing state. 103
While some banks within a state may be nationally charted, most
banks are state-charted and correspondingly have a significant
presence and operations within a state. 104 Naturally, a consumer
seeking to make a wire transfer will recognize that the remittance tax
can be avoided simply by performing the transaction at an exempted
competitor. Thus, to the extent that local or state banks may be the
beneficiaries of such customer diversions, such a remittance tax may
favor state businesses over out-of-state businesses. In addition, nonbank money transmitters are placed at a further disadvantage from instate banks and credit unions because of the burdens of complying
with the taxing statute. Because the costs of training, collecting,
reporting, and remitting the taxes adds a cost to the process of wiring
money using through a non-bank money transmitter, the tax may
impose a competitive disadvantage between out-of-state businesses
and in-state businesses.
As banks and credit unions are becomingly increasingly
competitive in the remittance industry, states should consider equal
application of a remittance tax to all financial institutions within its
jurisdiction in order to avoid an appearance of economic
protectionism. Federal law has recently recognized the similarities
between banks offering remittance services and non-banks offering
remittance services by extending a consumer protection law equally
to financial institutions engaging in cross-border wire transfers. As
such, federal law recognizes that banks and non-bank entities offer
competitive remittance sending products to the extent that the
102. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § I 073(a); 15 U.S.C. §
16930-1(g)(3) (2013).
103. See, e.g., 2011 WESTERN UNION ANNUAL REPORT, 6, 19 available at http://ir.westemu
nion.corn/files/doc_financia!s/WU2011AR.pdf; About Us, MONEYGRAM, http://ww
w.moneygram.corn!MGICorp/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).
I 04. See AM. BANKERS Ass'N, THE BENEFITS OF CHARTER CHOICE: THE DUAL BANKING
SYSTEM AS A CASE STUDY, 2, available at http://www.aba.com/ABIA/Documents/25
6b2738c 12e40688b23b325fl Oill909Dual_Banking_Charter_1 00409999992.doc.
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consumers of both entities deserve equal disclosures and protections
under consumer protection laws.
IV. REMITTANCE TAXES UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE

A.

Overview OfThe Equal Protection Doctrine

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 105
Under the doctrine of Equal Protection, persons who are similarly
situated must be treated similarly. 106 However, equal protection of
the laws is not guaranteed to persons who are not similarly situated. 107
Generally, Equal Protection challenges pivot on whether a
classification made by a state improperly discriminates or
disadvantages a class of persons. 108 Equal Protection jurisprudence
recognizes that states must have flexibility to make distinctions and
generalizations in order to effectively govem. 109 "A legislature must
have substantial latitude to establish classifications that roughly
approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate
competing concerns both public and private, and that account for
limitations on the practical ability of the State to remedy every ill." 110
Such a deferential standard of review is not warranted in every
Equal Protection case.'" Where a state attempts to legislate on the
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. For a thorough understanding of the historical movement
behind equal protection, see Alfred Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the Laws: The
Original Understanding, 12 N.Y. L.F. 385,386-425, explaining the historical legacy
of the equal protection movement, including the drafting of the amendment, the
passage of the amendment, and the early interpretations of the amendment.
106. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
107. See id. at 248. (Burger, J., dissenting) (noting that although the Equal Protection
Clause guarantees similar treatment of similarly situated persons, the Court can
increase or decrease the degree of "judicial scrutiny" after asking if there is a
legitimate reason for the discrepancy between the classes of people).
108. See id. at 237 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that this case deals with a
classification which disadvantages children); id. at 248 (Burger, J., dissenting)
(stating that in order to determine if the discrimination is improper, the Court
examines whether there is a legitimate reason for the inconsistency).
109. SeeRy. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1949) (holding that
judicial deference should be given to legislative judgments in the field of economic
regulation).
110. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (majority opinion).
Ill. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516 (1996) (applying heightened
scrutiny to a gender based classification at a state-supported university); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, II (1967) (applying the most rigid scrutiny to a state
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basis of certain classifications deemed to be suspect, such as race or
national origin, the law will be reviewed under strict scrutiny. 112
Under this most rigid scrutiny standard, a state must show that the
statute is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government
interest. 113 The Court has also determined that classifications based
on legitimacy and gender are deemed semi-suspect and afforded a
heightened level of review, although not strict scrutiny. 114 If neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect classification is implicated, then the
law will receive highly deferential review, and will be upheld so long
as the classification is shown to have some rational basis to a
legitimate government interest. 115 However, on rare occasions, the
Court has invalidated statutes under this most lenient test because it
found the statute was based on animus. 116
B.

The Doctrine OfAnimus

A finding of unconstitutional animus is significant to any rational
basis review because such a finding is the only way a plaintiff can
secure a victory on the most lenient standard of review. 117 For
example, in the seminal case of US. Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, the Court invalidated a law under the rational basis test

miscegenation law); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
(applying strict scrutiny to a federal law classification based on national origin).
112. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215.
113. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2006) (validating the law school's
narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions process in order to further the
compelling interest of having a diverse student body).
114. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (rejecting that a classification
based on illegitimacy should be held to strict scrutiny but it deserves more
exacting scrutiny than an economic interest); Craig v. Boren, 492 U.S. 190,
197(1976) (holding that gender classifications must serve important governmental
interests and must be substantially related to the attainment of those interests);
see also S. SIDNEY ULMER, SUPREME COURT POLICYMAKING AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 425 (1986) (summarizing the Court's jurisprudence in using heightened
scrutiny).
115. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a classification based on
homosexuality bears no rational relation to a legitimate government pwpose); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,450 (1985) (holding that a classification
based on mental disabilities is subject to rational basis review); Ma:>s. Brd of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307,314 (1976) (holding that a classification based on age is subject to review under
the rational basis standard).
116. See Romer, 517 at 635; City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435;Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S.
429,443 (1984); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973). For a
complete review of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on animus, see Susannah W.
Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 887 (20 12).
117. Pollvogt, supra note 116,at 889.
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based on a finding of animus. 118 The case challenged an amendment
to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, which withdrew food stamp
allowances if any person living in a household was unrelated to the
other household resident. 119 The law was challenged under Equal
Protection because it created two classes of persons for food stamp
purposes, one class "composed of those individuals who live in
households all of whose members are related to one another, and the
other class consists of those individuals who live in households
containing one or more members who are unrelated to the rest." 120
Since the law did not invoke a suspect classification, nor did it
involve a fundamental right, the Court applied rational basis
review. 121
The Court held that the relatedness or unrelatedness of the
household members was irrelevant to the Act's express purposes of
improving nutrition among the poor and the distribution of
agricultural surpluses. 122 The Court held that an intent to discriminate
against "hippies," reflected in the legislative history, was not a
legitimate governmental interest. 123 "[I]f. . . 'equal protection of the
laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 124
Similarly, the Court invalidated a local ordinance based on a
rational basis review after a finding of animus. 125 Here, the Court
reviewed a city council's decision under a municipal ordinance to
deny a special use permit for the building of a group home for
persons with mental disabilities. 126 The Court determined that
rational basis review was appropriate and rejected the argument that
persons with mental disabilities should be deemed a suspect
classification. 127 The Court found that the denial of the permit to the
group home was based on stereotypes, societal fears, and private
bias. 128 The Court considered the purported interests of the City
Council's decision including, overcrowding, building on a flood
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

U.S. Dep't ofAgric., 413 U.S. at 534.
!d. at 529.
!d.
!d. at 533-34.
!d. at 533-34, 538.
!d. at 534.
!d.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,449-50 (1985).
Jdat447-48.
!d. at 446.
!d. at 448.
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plain, and traffic congestion. 129 However, these interests were
irrelevant to the classification because they would still be present
whether a group home for the mentally disabled, an apartment
building, or a nursing home was built. 130 The Court inferred that
"requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded." 131
Most recently in its cases of animus jurisprudence, the Court
invalidated an amendment to the Colorado constitution which would
have prohibited any government action from protecting a class of
persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation. 132 The
Court declined to address whether sexual orientation was a suspect
classification, or whether the Amendment infringed on a fundamental
right, thereby requiring the application of heightened scrutiny. 133
Instead, the Court applied rational basis review, appearing to
acknowledge its deferential nature: "a law will be sustained if it can
be said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law
seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if
the rationale for it seems tenuous." 134 Of significance, Romer was
decided prior to the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas that held
that it was unconstitutional to criminalize homosexual activity
between consenting adults in private. 135 Thus, the Romer majority
sidestepped the question as to whether it was permissible to disfavor
homosexual status when the law disfavored homosexual conduct. 136
Instead, the Court held that the structure of the Amendment created
distinctions between classes of persons where no distinctions
previously existed. 137 Subsequently, the Court determined that a law
may not draw classifications of persons "for the purpose of
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law . . . [because] 'class
legislation ... [is] obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. '" 138

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 448-50.
/d.
/d. at 450.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 635 (1996).
/d. at 631-32.
See id. at 632.
Compare id. with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 628-30.
See id. at 633.
See id. at 633-35 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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C. Analyzing Remittance Taxes Under the Equal Protection Clause
Some remittance taxes may be susceptible to an Equal Protection
challenge. However, an Equal Protection challenge is very factspecific and the outcome can only be determined on a case-by-case
approach. 139 Many of the remittance taxes examined in this comment
are not likely to present an Equal Protection challenge. For example,
the Oklahoma remittance tax is not likely to fail under Equal
Protection scrutiny because it does not make a classification that is
unreasonable to achieve a legitimate government interest. To begin
with, the wire transfer tax in Oklahoma does not make an
unreasonable classification. Any person in Oklahoma seeking to
make a wire transfer through a non-bank money transmitter will have
to pay the tax. 140 In addition, the bill was sponsored with the intent to
fund the Department of Investigation's Drug Money Laundering and
Wire Transmitter Revolving Fund. 141 The Oklahoma legislature
perceived that this tax would assist state law enforcement efforts in
capturing money launders and illegal drug activities that use wire
transfers to move their profits. 142
Arguably, the measure is
underinclusive, as it does not capture all wire transfers since banks
and credit unions offer competitive services to money transmitters. 143
However, a legislature may enact legislation that takes incremental
steps to eradicate a perceived problem, so long as the means is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 144 A state
undeniably has policing authority over criminal activities such as
what is being targeted by the Oklahoma legislature. 145 Therefore, the
Oklahoma remittance tax is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest and would survive an Equal Protection
challenge. Several states have considered remittance tax models very
similar to that of the Oklahoma model, from the structure of the
proposal to the intended usage of the revenues 146 ; the above analysis
would be applicable to these types of proposals.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See Alice Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the Equal Protection Mill, 70 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 387,456 (1999).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-503.1j (West Supp. 2014).
See id.
See Monies, supra note 13.
§ 2-503.1j.
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 745, 785-86 (2007).
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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However, it is worthwhile to examine remittance tax measures to
understand when they may offend the Equal Protection clause. A tax
may be held invalid on Equal Protection grounds if it was enacted
with nothing more than bare animus to harm a politically unpopular
group and does not bear a rational relation to a legitimate government
interest. 147 While the following examination will be case-specific, the
principals from this analysis are relevant to any legislature
considering enacting a remittance tax.
As previously noted, Equal Protection analysis begins with the
determination of the measure's classification. 148 Remittance tax
proposals that apply the tax to consumers who are unable to prove
their lawful presence in the country is essentially a classification
illegal immigration status. 149 Although state laws that classify based
on alienage receive the highest level of scrutiny in an equal
protection challenge, 150 classifications based on illegal immigration
do not. 151 The Court, in its landmark holding of Plyler v. Doe boldly
articulated that an adult illegal immigrant has no right to feel entitled
to receive any state benefits afforded to its residents. 152 Further, a
remittance tax does not invoke a fundamental right as it is merely an
economic regulation. 153 Thus, a remittance tax will be based on
rational review basis.
Even under a rational review examination, tax proposals that are
designed to penalize undocumented immigrants may be invalidated
because the measure is based on a bare desire to harm a politically
unpopular group. Such a finding of animus is rare, 154 however,
remittance tax measures fueled by anti-immigrant sentiments may
encounter this constitutional flaw. In some instances, state legislators
have made their policy intentions well-known as they work to
advance such tax measures. 155 For example, in Georgia and North
Carolina, legislators titled their respective legislation the "Illegal
Immigrant Fee Act." 156 In Mississippi, a state Senator sponsored a
remittance tax bill specifically to penalize "those illegals . . . [who]

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

U.S. Dep't of Agric. V. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
See discussion infra Part IV .A.
See H.B. 1238, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006).
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,371-72 (1971).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
!d. at 219-20.
See id. at 216-20.
See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
H.B. 1238, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006); H.B. 2560, 2005-2006 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2005).
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are constantly wiring money back to Mexico or Guatemala ... taking
money out of our economy, [and] we are never going to see that
money again." 157 Such remarks may demonstrate that the intended
purpose of the tax is to punish undocumented immigrants for taking
money out of the state's economy. In addition, remittance tax
proposals that apply the tax only to consumers wiring money to
Mexico or South America, or another specific country, may trigger an
Equal Protection challenge based on the reasonableness of the
classification.
Although states do have a legitimate interest in protecting its jobs,
resources, and collecting taxes, 158 it can be argued that an
undocumented immigrant is not taking money out of a state's
economy by wiring a portion of his earnings to his native country.
An undocumented person contributes to the state's economy by the
mere act of living and working within the state. 159 Furthermore, a
person's earnings or wages belong to the individual and not the
state. 160 While the state has taxing authority over such wages, such
wages are ultimately the property of the individual, be it a U.S.
citizen or an undocumented alien. 161
Other legislators sponsoring similar remittance tax proposals have
offered similar arguments to express the need for such a bill. 162
Although statements vary from legislator to legislator, a common
theme of hostility and resentment towards illegal immigrants is
expressed. 163 In Texas, for example, a legislator expressed that the
intention of his remittance tax proposal was to make Texas a "less
attractive state for undocumented immigrants." 164 Establishing the
intent of a punitive tax on arguments based on stereotypes or
irrational fear may trigger an animus analysis under the Equal
Protection Clause.

157.

Interview by JT Williamson with State Senator Joey Fillingaine, in Hattiesburg, Miss.
(Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.wnd.com/2011/01/257501/.
158. See Legarre, supra note 145, at 794.
159. Christian Barry & Gerhard Overland, Why Remittances to Poor Countries Should Not
Be Taxed, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &POL. 1181, 1198 (2010).
160. See id. at 1189-90.
161. See id. at 1189.
162. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 149-53 and accompanying text.
164. Zahira Torres, Bill That Would Add 8% Fee to Remittances Presented to Panel, EL
PASO TIMES, March 15, 2011, http://www.e1pasotimes.com/news/ci_17614769.
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Although a court is highly deferential to the legislature under a
rational basis analysis, 165 a remittance tax may still be invalidated
because it is not rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. 166 For example, in 2011, several states considered remittance
tax legislation that would have imposed a tax on all cross-border wire
transfers. 167 The legislative intent of the measures was to raise
revenue for the building of the U.S.-Mexico border fence. 168 If a state
did not share a border with Mexico, then the revenue raised by a
remittance tax would be dispersed to a state along the southwest
border. 169
States have broad authority under the police power to regulate and
tax as necessary to govem. 170 However, it is unlikely that a court
could reasonably find that a state has a legitimate interest in raising
revenue for national border security efforts. There may be an
argument that a state sharing a border with Mexico does have a
legitimate interest in raising revenue to fund the state's own border
fence. However, such an argument is less plausible if that state does
not have a border with Mexico, such as Mississippi.
An argument may be made that states have a legitimate interest in
protecting their own resources, and consequently, states have a
legitimate interest in enacting border security measures. 171 Such an
interest is rationally related to a tax on undocumented migrants
because undocumented immigrants illegally crossing the southwest
border are the very source for the need for enhanced border security.
Border security, however, is a matter of national scope, and not a
legitimate interest for a state to take up on its own accord. 172
Therefore, such proposals that seek to tax undocumented immigrants
with the expressed purpose of sending the raised revenue to borderstates for the construction of a border fence may fail even a rational
basis review test.
V. CONCLUSION
Immigration, specifically illegal immigration, has become one of
the most controversial political debates facing state and federal
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,447-48 (1985).
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
See, e.g., S.B. 2255, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011).
!d.
See id.
See Legarre, supra note 145, at 785.
See id. at 786.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012).
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policymakers. In the halls of Congress, legislators are faced with
making meaningful policies that attract a diverse population of
immigrants in a lawful manner, protect national resources and
national security, and that provide our economy with the skilled and
unskilled laborers as necessary. 173 Legislators in state houses must
ensure that the state's resources and finances are used in the most
efficient and just manner. 174
Remittance tax measures are efforts to gain revenue from a class of
persons perceived not to be paying their fair share. 175 In times of dire
budget constraints, the remittance tax model has become increasingly
attractive to state lawmakers. 176 However, the bills considered thus
far may prove flawed under the Dormant Commerce Clause because
they favor in-state interest over out-of-state interests. Furthermore,
remittance tax bills, designed with the intent to penalize
undocumented immigrants, may be flawed under the Equal
Protection Clause. As states further consider such remittance tax
measures, they must ensure the tax is equally and fairly applied to all
consumers sending remittances is critical to the constitutional validity
of these tax measures.
Meredith Cipriano*

See Bernstein, supra note 3.
See Nat' I Conf. of State Legs., supra note 4.
See Harris Blackwood, Bill Would Tax Illegal Immigrants for Money Transfers,
GAINESVILLE TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, http://archive.gainesvilletimes.com/news/stories/2
0060214/localnews/66760.shtml (quoting a sponsor of the bill, Rep. James Mills, "We
called it exactly what it is, an illegal immigrant fee ... We've got an illegal immigrant
problem in Georgia and if it's not going to be dealt with at the border, we're going to
start dealing with these symptoms in the ways we can.").
176. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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